Healthcare organisations face a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) transition that neither providers nor suppliers can complete alone. Patient records, diagnostic images, and genomic data can remain sensitive for decades or longer. The public-key algorithms protecting much of this data today may become vulnerable to future quantum computers running Shor's algorithm.
ExeQuantum works with security teams across regulated sectors to convert this complexity into a governed, evidence-based migration path. This article maps the shared responsibilities connecting hospital security leaders and health-technology vendors.
Healthcare delivery depends on a layered ecosystem. Hospitals procure infusion pumps, patient monitors, imaging modalities, and electronic health record (EHR) platforms from multiple vendors. Products can depend on different cryptographic libraries, certificates, and update mechanisms.
A provider typically cannot independently modify a supplier-controlled medical device. A manufacturer may have no authority over hospital-managed network services. The planning boundary should follow actual control, support agreements, and clinical safety requirements.
This coordination gap is well recognised. The NIST NCCoE Migration to PQC project identifies two core workstreams for the transition: cryptographic discovery and interoperability testing. Both require collaboration between asset owners and the vendors whose products they deploy.
In healthcare, that collaboration is complicated by device certification timelines, shared-service models, and the diversity of connected equipment. Migration planning that addresses only one side of this relationship will leave gaps on the other.
Healthcare environments rely on public-key cryptography at multiple layers. TLS protects data in transit between EHR systems, patient portals, and laboratory information systems. Digital certificates authenticate device identity and secure firmware updates.
Several of these layers rely on algorithms that Shor's algorithm could break at sufficient qubit scale, including RSA for key exchange, ECDH for session negotiation, and ECDSA for authentication. NIST has published quantum-safe replacements: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA).
Not every cryptographic component is equally exposed. Symmetric algorithms and hash functions face a smaller reduction in security margin under Grover's algorithm, so the transition primarily affects public-key operations.
Supplier dependencies add complexity. A single patient-monitoring platform may embed a TLS library from one vendor, a certificate authority chain issued by another, and a firmware-signing key managed by the original equipment manufacturer.
Each dependency carries its own migration timeline and algorithm inventory. Without visibility across the full chain, neither the provider nor the supplier can scope the transition accurately.
The responsibilities outlined below are an editorial framework for planning, not statutory obligations. Actual ownership depends on your organisation's contracts, shared-service arrangements, and regulatory context. Providers, suppliers, and their shared interface each carry distinct planning considerations.
Where hospitals and health systems control their own network perimeter, identity infrastructure, and risk governance, their planning responsibilities may include working toward current TLS versions on gateways, reviewing VPN configurations, managing internal PKI, and building a cryptographic inventory of enterprise IT assets.
In shared-service or managed-hosting arrangements, some of these areas may fall to a third party. Clarify ownership boundaries before assuming provider-side control.
Medical-device manufacturers and health-technology vendors own the cryptographic stack inside their products. This includes inventorying algorithms each device model uses, publishing quantum-safe alternatives with update pathways, and providing interoperability test results for hybrid or PQC-only operation.
Unclear provider-supplier boundaries can leave migration tasks without an accountable owner. Joint responsibilities include agreeing on a minimum TLS version for new procurements, defining certificate lifecycle management for algorithm transitions, and running interoperability pilots before production deployment.
Procurement is one practical lever you have for accelerating post-quantum readiness across its device fleet. Requesting structured evidence shifts the conversation from vendor assurances to verifiable artefacts.
Providers should ask each supplier for a per-product inventory listing every cryptographic algorithm, key length, and protocol version in use. A standards-compliant Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) in CycloneDX format gives procurement and security teams a machine-readable baseline.
This inventory should cover the device's TLS library, embedded certificate chains, firmware-signing keys, and session-negotiation protocols.
For each product, suppliers should document which NIST-standardised PQC algorithms they plan to support, starting with ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key exchange and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for digital signatures.
The documentation should specify whether the update is a configuration change, a firmware update, or a hardware replacement, along with the expected timeline for availability.
Request controlled test evidence covering compatibility, latency, resource use, and rollback against representative deployment requirements. ExeQuantum documents its platform integrations; medical-device compatibility still requires separate validation with your manufacturer and clinical engineering team.
Suppliers should also provide a scoped migration roadmap. This roadmap should name each device model, its target algorithm set, the update mechanism, and the projected delivery date.
Requesting evidence from suppliers is only half of the equation. Providers also need to demonstrate their own readiness to internal stakeholders, regulators, and board-level risk committees.
Assign explicit ownership of the PQC transition to a named programme lead, typically within the CISO's office. Define measurable milestones: inventory coverage, supplier CBOMs reviewed, unresolved dependencies, and pilot exit criteria met. Record negotiated key-establishment and signature algorithms separately: a TLS version alone does not demonstrate post-quantum protection.
Run time-bounded tests in isolated, non-production environments under clinical engineering and manufacturer oversight. Testing should include rollback validation so that devices can revert to a known-good configuration if PQC negotiation introduces unexpected behaviour.
Document findings and share them with your suppliers so they can refine their firmware and migration tooling. Before patient-facing deployment, complete applicable clinical safety, change-control, and regulatory reviews with relevant manufacturer input.
Plan for a staged transition rather than assuming every cryptographic dependency can change together. Some legacy devices may not be updatable at all. The 2025 npj Digital Medicine commentary noted that constrained embedded environments and long device certification timelines can create inherent migration delays.
Honest reporting of what has been migrated, what is in progress, and what remains blocked gives regulators and auditors a defensible position.
The following questions are designed for procurement meetings, vendor review sessions, and internal security planning. They translate the editorial framework above into concrete discussion items. Adapt them to your organisation's contractual and regulatory context.
Patient records, genomic profiles, and diagnostic images can remain sensitive for a patient's lifetime. This potential for long-lived confidentiality makes certain healthcare data a candidate for harvest-now-decrypt-later collection, where adversaries capture encrypted traffic today and store it for decryption once quantum computers reach sufficient scale.
The device manufacturer typically owns the cryptographic stack embedded in the product, including the TLS library, certificate chain, and firmware-signing keys. The provider's role is to request evidence of PQC readiness and align network-side configurations accordingly. The transition works when both sides produce and exchange structured evidence.
Discovery comes before migration. The first step is to inventory every cryptographic asset, algorithm, and protocol version across your enterprise and connected-device fleet. ExeQuantum's CipherScout supports enterprise discovery and inventory. To review programme-level gaps first, use the PQC readiness self-assessment; it is an illustrative questionnaire, not a scan of your environment.
Applicable requirements depend on jurisdiction, contractual obligations, and the regulatory frameworks governing your organisation. General PQC transition guidance from bodies like NIST does not automatically constitute a healthcare compliance obligation.
Organisations should consult legal and compliance advisors to determine how evolving cryptographic standards intersect with their own regulatory obligations, procurement contracts, and data-protection commitments.
A Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) is a machine-readable inventory of every cryptographic component in a product or environment. It lists algorithms, key lengths, protocol versions, and certificate dependencies.
In healthcare, a CBOM gives providers visibility into supplier-controlled cryptography and gives suppliers a format for communicating PQC posture. ExeQuantum's EQCore platform supports cryptographic inventory and CycloneDX CBOM output, helping both sides work from a shared baseline.
The NIST NCCoE Migration to PQC project provides practical resources on cryptographic discovery and interoperability testing. Review primary publications and their status before using them as planning inputs.
The NIST NCCoE Migration to PQC project adds practical guidance through its cryptographic discovery and interoperability testing workstreams. Healthcare organisations should review these resources alongside any sector-specific guidance from their own regulators and standards bodies.
Shared responsibility creates a documented, auditable interface between providers and suppliers. Providers gain visibility into cryptographic posture they cannot inspect directly. Suppliers gain clarity on protocol and certificate requirements their devices must meet.